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vForeword
Foreword
Globally, police forces are increasing their use of 
specialist units within their organisational structure. 
Specialist units are generally either technical in 
nature (eg forensics), or operational (eg drug or  
fraud squads) and require innovative performance 
measurement frameworks to properly evaluate their 
effectiveness within the broader policing context. 
In this report, the development of a performance 
measurement framework for Auckland Metropolitan 
Crime and Operational Support (AMCOS), a 
specialist policing unit of the New Zealand Police,  
is described. AMCOS encompasses a range of 
technical and niche units supporting policing 
operations in New Zealand. The performance 
framework, reflecting the roles and functions of  
the unit covers—forensic performance measures, 
operations support performance measures, 
intelligence performance measures and 
investigations performance measures. 
The authors have written at a practical level that will 
assist practitioners to develop similar frameworks 
that can meet the needs of their specialist units,  
but that also reflects on analytical and theoretical 
aspects of performance measurement systems.  
The AIC’s Technical and Background Paper series is 
aimed at methodological research that informs best 
practice and this paper will provide police services 
with an insight into the development of a successful 
framework that has assisted NZ policing to monitor 
and improve its performance.
Adam Tomison
Director
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ixExecutive summary
In the past two decades, public sector performance 
(and by extension police performance) has become 
increasingly important, especially in the Western 
world. However, while there is extensive academic 
work being done on the generalist tasks undertaken 
by most policemen every day, there has been very 
little attention paid to specialist policing performance. 
This is of some concern, as specialist policing 
presents a number of interesting challenges to the 
observer, particularly in terms of clearly identifying 
the role played by specialist policing in achieving 
larger outcomes. This report examines the issue of 
performance reporting in the specialist policing field 
and describes the development of an innovative 
performance framework for specialist policing by  
the Auckland Metropolitan Crime and Operational 
Support (AMCOS), a specialist policing unit of the 
New Zealand Police.
There has been increasing attention paid to public 
sector performance management in recent years, 
and many Western police forces have correspondingly 
become increasingly performance-focused, despite 
the challenges they face in doing so. The benefits 
that can accrue from performance measurement 
include improving value for money, improving 
managerial competency and increasing accountability 
(Collier 2006). But difficulties that relate to so-called 
‘perverse behaviours’ can also arise (Loveday 2005: 
98), where for a variety of reasons, performance 
measures become more important than the valuable 
activities they seek to describe.
Adopting performance measures for specialist 
policing has introduced its own set of challenges. 
Specialist policing is most easily defined by 
specifying what it is not—it is not the general, 
reactive patrol and investigative capability that 
comprises the majority of most police forces. Rather, 
specialist policing comprises two main categories—
technical units, such as forensics and specialist 
operational units (eg helicopter, dog), and niche 
units, which are often investigative units engaged  
in proactive operations against a particular 
subcategory of criminality (eg drugs). The general 
lack of performance measurement attention that  
has been paid to specialist policing activities is likely 
related to issues of responsibility. Technical units 
provide a small part of a greater outcome and 
identifying what part they played in that outcome 
can be almost impossible. Niche units face even 
greater challenges, as their work can be lost among 
a much larger quantity of generalist activity. As such, 
it seems most rewarding to focus specialist policing 
performance measurement on outputs, at least until 
there is sufficient theory to take the next step to an 
outcome focus.
The AMCOS performance framework was developed 
locally, to guard against the imposition of a more 
generic model as well as promote flexibility and an 
emphasis on improvement rather than accountability. 
The framework, while focused on specialist policing 
outputs, is clearly linked to outcomes at the strategic 
level. The four main categories of the framework fall 
within the broader concept of technical and niche 
units described previously and comprise:
•	 forensic performance measures;
•	 operations support performance measures;
•	 intelligence performance measures; and
•	 investigations performance measures.
Identifying and developing measures for these 
categories was affected by different considerations, 
for example, the general absence of agreed 
definitions and reliable data on which to frame 
investigations performance measures and the 
contributory rather than absolute effect that forensics 
units have on major police outputs and outcomes.
Executive summary
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Five factors were identified as being either critical  
in the development or implementation of such a 
framework. These were:
•	 the importance of managerial support;
•	 the value of consulting previous work, 
•	 the necessity of consultation, 
•	 issues around identifying respective shares of 
specialist resources to other policing groups, and
•	 recognition of ongoing difficulties with measuring 
the performance of niche units.
The next evolution of the AMCOS performance 
framework will focus on improving an understanding 
of the links between outputs and outcomes. 
AMCOS is currently working towards aligning  
and integrating performance measurement into its 
business planning, project management and risk 
management frameworks. The end goal is to have a 
centrally directed, but locally managed, performance 
management framework based on core strategic 
goals, which is integrated into planning and project 
management processes. This integration is operating 
on the principle that performance is only valuable if it 
serves as the basis for action.
1Introduction
It has been said that professionalism in policing  
rests upon four pillars—accountability, legitimacy, 
innovation and national coherence (Stone & Travis 
2011). In turn, the first three of those pillars rest 
upon knowledge of what police do, especially  
in terms of their performance. There cannot be 
accountability, legitimacy, or innovation until what 
has been done is truly understood. Numerous books 
and articles have been written on the topic of police 
performance, covering everything from complex 
statistical data, to the reactions of the public to 
police on the street (for useful introductory papers 
see Blumstein 1999; Braga & Moore 2003a; Collier 
2006; Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011). British 
Home Secretaries have commented on the issue, 
noting that police performance ‘is about delivering 
the best possible service to the public’ (Home Office 
Police Standards Unit 2004: np) and given the 
attention that surrounds the annual publication of 
crime statistics, it is likely that the public also have 
strong views on how well the police are performing.
Amid the vast literature on police performance, 
however, very few works examine the issue of 
specialist policing performance—police intelligence 
groups, in terms of both intelligence collection and 
analysis; proactive investigation teams, such as 
drugs and organised crime; forensics units, including 
crime scene analysis; and advanced operational 
support, such as air, sea and canine capabilities. 
There are some studies of particular niches of the 
specialist policing environment (Canadian Police 
College Council of Investigative Excellence 2004; 
Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011; Willis, Anderson 
& Homel 2011), but they do not show links with 
other niches, or the difference between their 
particular topic and the general policing 
environment.
The purpose of this report is to show how AMCOS, 
a specialist policing unit of the New Zealand  
Police, has developed an innovative performance 
framework. This framework, which is continually 
updated, has followed the advice of experts and 
been derived from national strategic guidance, but 
shaped by local considerations.
In this report, the concept of specialist policing is 
defined and then some of the general difficulties 
surrounding police performance management are 
examined. The authors then explore the overall 
conceptual underpinning of the AMCOS system, 
before focusing more closely on the four main  
areas of AMCOS capability—forensics, specialist 
operations, intelligence and proactive investigations. 
Consideration is then given to describing both what 
has been done to date, as well as the improvements 
that will be made to the framework in the future. The 
report is deliberately focused at the practitioner level, 
but also includes mention of the various analytical 
and theoretical issues that have shaped development 
of the framework.
Introduction
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What is specialist policing?
Before one can talk about performance 
measurement for specialist policing, clarification is 
needed on what is meant by the term itself. It is a 
concept that can be difficult to be precise about and 
its particular characteristics will vary depending on 
the specifics of the law enforcement organisation  
in which such capabilities are based. Perhaps the 
easiest way to begin a definitional discussion is not 
to say what specialist policing is, but rather what it  
is not.
It is not the general public-triggered response/patrol 
capability that remains the core of most law 
enforcement agencies, especially in the Anglo-
American tradition (Braga & Moore 2003a). It is  
also not the generalist, investigative capability that  
is usually the second largest component of law 
enforcement agencies. Both of these elements  
are reactive components whose level of demand  
is largely dependent on public requests and that 
usually have primary responsibility for the resolution 
of recorded incidents, whether they are serious 
crimes or disorder.
Specialist policing comprises two main types  
of units—those with very specific technical skills  
or capabilities who deal with a broad range of 
criminality, termed technical units (forensics, 
specialist operations and some intelligence units); 
and those with broader technical skills but who 
focus proactively, rather than in response to public 
requests, on a specific subset of criminality, termed 
niche units (proactive investigation units). Usually,  
a specialist policing unit will not have primary 
responsibility for crime control in a particular 
geographic area; it may be a sub-element of the 
group that has that responsibility, or it may well  
be part of an entirely different organisation. AMCOS 
fits the first type, while the FBI fits the second  
type. Often, specialist policing units will be multi-
jurisdictional and will work across various law 
enforcement boundaries. They will often participate 
in multi-agency activities (Mackenzie & Hamilton-
Smith 2011; Schneider & Hurst 2008) but will 
seldom be the lead agency.
From the above, it is obvious why technical units 
cannot be held responsible for crime in a particular 
geographic locale. A forensics unit cannot be held 
primarily responsible for crime resolution rates in a 
particular city, although its support is essential to 
such resolutions; and a dog unit cannot be held 
responsible for the number of car thefts although, 
again, its support is essential. They are thus 
contributory to, rather than responsible for, outcomes. 
With niche units, the issue of responsibility is more 
confused. Proactive units, such as drugs squads, 
will have primary responsibility for a particular crime 
type in a particular area, but there will often be a 
cross-over with generalist units, such as in the 
number of street-level drug arrests.
In the United Kingdom, the term protective services 
is sometimes used to refer to something quite similar 
to the concept of specialist policing (Flanagan 2008; 
O’Connor 2005) and in Australia, it often refers to 
police providing court security, prisoner transfer  
and at times, transport security officers. This report 
avoids the term for two reasons. First, it is counter-
intuitive. For the average citizen, the term police 
protective services conveys the image of uniformed 
constables walking the beat on a Friday night, rather 
than specialist investigations into organised crime. 
Second, protective services includes homicide 
investigations and responses to disorder, which seem 
more akin to general response and investigation 
rather than fitting into the categories of technical  
and niche units.
AMCOS was designed to serve as a single 
repository for specialist policing services in the upper 
half of the North Island of New Zealand. Technical 
units include forensics components (forensic imaging, 
fingerprints and criminal profiling), specialist 
operational groups (dogs, air support and maritime 
units among others) and an intelligence collection 
and analysis section. Niche units include a number 
of proactive investigation teams primarily focused  
on drugs, organised crime and national security 
problems. Internationally, specialist policing units 
vary in detail (see NSW Police Force 2012; 
Queensland Police 2011) but the broad concept 
remains. As such, anything learned from measuring 
the performance of AMCOS has global applicability.
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Those with some knowledge of this topic may 
already have a question—if specialist policing units 
are not primarily responsible for crime control in a 
particular area, how can the popular measurements 
of recorded crime rates be used to evaluate them? 
This is indeed the key question, but before engaging 
with it directly, it is useful to set it in context by briefly 
examining issues of performance measurement  
in both the broader context of the public service  
and more specifically in relation to police forces. It is 
particularly important to understand the shortcomings 
and problems that surround the application of 
performance measurement to the police, as without 
such understanding, it is impossible to develop 
meaningful and useful performance frameworks.
Public sector performance 
measurement
Public sector performance measurement became  
an increasingly important issue in the Western world 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Carter, Klein & Day 1992; 
Fleming & Lafferty 2000; Schick 1996). Advocates  
of a new style of public service—sometimes termed 
New Public Management or NPM—hoped to propel 
what were seen as slow-moving, inefficient and 
overly bureaucratic organisations closer to a 
private-sector, corporate model, which would 
hopefully deliver better services for less money  
(van Sluis, Cachet & Ringeling 2008). Key to this 
push was accountability, which in turn required  
the development of performance measurement 
frameworks.
Performance measurement can be complex, so it  
is useful to clarify some core concepts. A standard 
performance classification scheme considers four 
elements—inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes. 
Inputs are the resources available to the organisation; 
the activities are the processes carried out by those 
resources. The outputs are the specific goods and 
services delivered, and the outcomes are the effect 
on the environment of those goods and services 
(Collier 2006). The total number of inputs used  
can be termed economy, the ratio between inputs 
and outputs efficiency, and the impact of outputs on 
outcomes can be termed effectiveness (Flynn 1986: 
393). Before the 1980s, performance measurement 
in the public sector—although it was unlikely to be 
called that—largely focused on inputs, especially 
staying within allocated budgets. Over time, there 
was an increasing focus on efficiency indicators 
(Carter, Klein & Day 1992; Smith 1990). Today, it is 
generally felt that a focus on outputs and outcomes 
is of more benefit, especially when evaluating the 
quality of police work (Collier 2006). For the police  
in particular, the outcome of ‘harm reduction’ has 
become increasingly central (Mackenzie & Hamilton-
Smith 2011).
Parameters of 
performance 
measurement
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Three broad benefits of performance measurement 
have been identified, namely improving value  
for money (efficiency), improving managerial 
competence and increasing accountability (Collier 
2006). However, performance measurement can 
also have costs and not merely in terms of the 
resources required to undertake measurement. 
Smith (1995a) has identified eight negative effects 
ensuing from the publication of such data, including:
•	 tunnel vision—an emphasis on quantified elements 
of performance at the expense of other aspects;
•	 suboptimisation—the pursuit of narrow objectives 
at the expense of greater success;
•	 myopia—the pursuit of short-term success at the 
expense of long-term success;
•	 measure fixation—an emphasis on measures 
rather than underlying objectives;
•	 misrepresentation—the deliberate manipulation  
of data;
•	 gaming—the deliberate manipulation of 
performance to gain strategic advantage;
•	 ossification—an overly rigid system of 
performance measurement; and
•	 misinterpretation—misunderstanding performance 
data.
Flynn (1986: 389) has stated:
At its worst, performance measurement has  
led to a concentration both on what is easily 
measured and what is susceptible to narrowly 
defined efficiency changes.
If targets are poorly defined and lack detail, problems 
reminiscent of those encountered in command 
economies can emerge (Smith 1990). Where there 
are too many indicators, however, there may be 
criticisms of unreliability, inflexibility and time wasting 
(Carter, Klein & Day 1992). Overly prescriptive 
indicators that specify not only what is to occur, but 
also how, can become divorced from the underlying 
objectives of the organisation. Thus, there is a  
need to carefully balance detail and prescription  
with freedom and flexibility.
While it is easy to assume that differing levels of 
performance by a given organisation (or sub-groups 
of that organisation) is primarily due to managerial 
competence, there are many reasons beyond the 
skills of a particular manager why those organisations 
(or sub-groups) might have differing levels of 
performance (Smith 1990). The organisations might 
have slightly different objectives, different needs, 
different costs, or might even measure performance 
differently. Separating out the impact of environmental 
factors (upon which any organisation has limited 
influence) on performance is a difficult task, but 
essential if the real value of management is to be 
identified.
The issue of ‘window-dressing’ is also important. 
Some writers suggest that performance measurement 
may sometimes be as much about the appearance 
of legitimacy as it is about instrumental improvement 
of performance (Collier 2008; Roy & Séguin 2000). 
This has been seen where organisations simply 
‘dress up’ existing statistics as performance 
indicators (Carter, Klein & Day 1992), rather  
than going to the trouble of developing specific 
frameworks. At its most extreme, this may result in a 
performance version of creative accountancy, where 
two sets of performance measures are maintained—
one for public consumption designed to ensure 
legitimacy is maintained and focusing on positive 
results, the other for internal use only (Flynn 1986).
The difficulty of measuring public sector performance 
can be illustrated by comparing the situation with 
that in the private sector. In the private sector, 
earning and profitability provide a convenient  
and simple ‘bottom line’ performance indicator. 
Despite that, private sector organisations have  
still developed large, complex sets of non-profit 
indicators (Bitichi et al. 2006; Carter, Klein & Day 
1992), realising that such indicators present a far 
more accurate and nuanced picture of organisational 
performance. In the public sector, by comparison, 
there is no clear ‘bottom line’—many important 
objectives are difficult to quantify and there is seldom 
an equivalent of earnings and profitability (Smith 
1995a). Thus, if a good private sector performance 
framework—where there is a ‘bottom line’—has  
to be complex, detailed and holistic—a good public 
sector performance framework has to be even more 
so.
Often, public sector activities are difficult to 
distinguish from one another, are produced in 
conjunction with other organisations and unfold  
over a lengthy period (Smith 1995a). Public sector 
performance is thus a particularly elusive concept 
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(Smith 1995a; Wisniewski & Olafsson 2004). This  
is especially the case with the police, where their 
goals are often complex objectives that cannot be 
achieved solely by police action (such as reductions 
in crime rates; Cockroft & Beattie 2009) and that are 
heavily dependent on the work of other agencies 
(Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011).
Police performance 
measurement
Around the world, but especially in the United 
Kingdom, there has been an increasing focus on 
police performance since approximately 1990 
(Collier 2006; van Sluis, Cachet & Ringeling 2008).  
In that time, there has been a range of reports 
aiming to ensure that its approximately 43 police 
forces report on performance in similar fashion (Audit 
Commission for Local Authorities and the National 
Health Service in England and Wales 1998a, 1998b; 
Collier 2006, 1998; Home Office 2005, 2004, 2002; 
Public Services Productivity Panel 2000), with  
the goal being a centre-driven improvement in 
effectiveness (Home Office 2008; Home Office 
Police Standards Unit 2004; Loveday 2006, 2005). 
In 2007, performance measures were rationalised  
at the national level to focus almost entirely on public 
trust and confidence, and more recently there has 
been a further move towards devolving responsibility 
for performance measurement from the national  
to the force level (Barton & Barton 2011). The 
cascading of performance indicators from the 
national level to the police constable on the street 
has had mixed results (Butterfield, Edwards & 
Woodall 2004).
Statistical systems, such as COMPSTAT (first in New 
York and then further afield; Braga & Moore 2003b; 
Rosenbaum 2007; Schneider, Chapman & Schapiro 
2009) have become increasingly common, focusing 
on the occurrence of specific crimes in limited areas 
over a particular timeframe (Stone & Travis 2011). In 
the Netherlands, a set of performance indicators for 
policing activities was introduced in the early 1990s 
(van Sluis, Cachet & Ringeling 2008). This was  
a major change for a police culture that had 
traditionally not been held particularly accountable 
for its actions or results (Hoogenboezem & 
Hoogenboezem 2005). In Australia, performance 
management was introduced into several state 
police services from the 1980s onwards (Fleming  
& Lafferty 2000), with Operational Performance 
Reviews (OPR) and similarly named reports 
deliberately emulating the COMPSTAT approach 
(Mazerolle, Rombouts & McBroom 2006).
As a result of this statistical focus, the rate of 
recorded and resolved crime has become the 
primary performance indicator for police around  
the world (Collier 2006; Dadds & Scheide 2000; 
Metropolitan Police Authority & Metropolitan Police 
Service 2009; New Zealand Police 2011; Western 
Australia Police 2011). In many police organisations, 
aggregated crime data are presented in league table 
formats showing the (perceived) comparative 
performance of different jurisdictions.
There has developed a debate about the applicability 
of simple, easy-to-use, numerical, ‘New Public 
Management’-type performance schemes to the 
policing environment (Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 
2011). Before discussing the shortcomings of such 
schemes, however, it must be remembered that this 
is a problem of police’s own making—it was police 
forces around the world who embraced such simple, 
easy-to-use measures, preferring them to devoting 
the necessary resources to develop more rigorous, 
analytical and evidentially based frameworks. This  
is in direct contrast to military services around the 
world (Blumstein 1999), where there has been a 
substantial level of investment in Centres for Lessons 
Learned and operational analysis (United States 
Army 2011). Had police forces emulated their 
military counterparts and focused on studies  
of historical performance, they might well have 
developed the sort of doctrine and conceptual 
frameworks that have led to quantum leaps in 
effectiveness for some military services and that 
could also serve as the basis for better performance 
frameworks (Alach 2010a). As such, while some 
police forces do now appear to be increasingly 
focused on the quality of their performance 
measurement (notably in the United Kingdom  
where the constant evolution of measures has 
occurred), the lack of real investment in the field over 
the past two decades indicates that the situation is 
fragmented at best (Roy & Séguin 2000). There has 
been very limited investment in the sort of evaluation 
and research activities that are necessary to gain a 
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better understanding of police performance 
(Weisburd & Neyroud 2011) and little evidence  
of police forces truly implementing those learnings 
that have been gained from the few research and 
evaluation activities that have occurred (Bradley 
2005; Chavez, Pendleton & Bueerman 2005; Lum 
2009).
It is questionable whether standard police 
performance measurement schemes, with their 
overwhelming focus on crime rates (often at the 
expense of other aspects of policing activity) are 
relevant and accurate (Collier 2006). They can  
be particularly inaccurate when measuring the 
performance of police forces that are switching,  
or have switched, from a traditional, professional 
model to a community policing model (Braga & 
Moore 2003b). Further, while outcomes are usually 
regarded as central to performance management, 
commentators on police performance often 
emphasise that how police act is as important as 
what they achieve; police performance is as much 
normative as it is technical (Audit Commission for 
Local Authorities and the National Health Service in 
England and Wales 1996, 1993; Collier 2006; van 
Sluis, Cachet & Ringeling 2008). The legitimacy of 
policing is vital (Braga & Moore 2003a) and league-
table type approaches cannot easily incorporate this 
aspect of performance; many actions such as mass 
random stop-and-searches that might improve 
performance vis a vis crime rates might actually 
harm police legitimacy. Related to this is the degree 
of alignment between what police perceive as good 
performance and what the public think; forces  
may focus on recovered and resolved crime rates, 
but the public may not perceive this as good 
performance (Kelling 1999), as they may continue  
to feel unsafe. Indeed, the public may well believe 
that any improvement in such statistics is merely  
the result of manipulation of recording practices by 
the police.
A narrow approach in performance measurement 
can lead to some of the negative effects cited by 
Smith earlier, particularly tunnel vision (Collier 2006). 
It can also lead to an over-emphasis on short-term 
targets at the expense of longer term objectives 
(Smith 1995a), despite the desirability of the latter 
(Collier 2006). The prioritisation decisions of police 
commanders will be influenced by the performance 
targets they are operating under, often leading them 
to devote the most resources to the most measured 
tasks, rather than those that may have more 
beneficial (albeit largely unmeasured) results (Davies 
2000; Dupon 2003; Fleming & Lafferty 2000; 
Hoogenboezem & Hoogenboezem 2005; Loveday 
1999; Vickers & Kouzmin 2001). A prescriptive 
approach to performance management can thus 
reduce the discretion of street-level police officers  
to best determine how to deal with a particular 
situation. This can, in turn, conflict with ‘old style’ 
police culture in which police discretion and flexibility 
is central (Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall 2004; 
Hoogenboezem & Hoogenboezem 2005).
The end result of performance measurement 
schemes can be ‘perverse’ behaviour, where 
performance targets or indicators become de-linked 
from the goals they are meant to achieve and 
instead become self-sustaining in their own right 
(Loveday 2005). Sometimes, the results are the 
opposite of those intended (Flynn 1986). This is 
more likely where the performance indicators focus 
on particular outputs, rather than outcomes or 
processes, which may ‘offer perverse incentives to 
carry out those activities where it is easiest to notch 
up a big score’ (Carter, Klein & Day 1992: 167). 
However, some seemingly perverse behaviour may 
not actually be such, as police outputs are often 
valuable in themselves (Braga & Moore 2003a), a 
point to which this paper will return later. Perverse 
behaviour can also be enabled by overly prescriptive 
performance indicators that do not allow for discretion 
or flexibility (Loveday 2005), as well as by 
performance indicators that are overly simplistic  
or mono-faceted and that fail to account for  
all relevant elements (Vollaard 2006).
Another key issue with police performance 
measurement is the differentiation between ‘hard’, 
ex-ante performance measurement, where targets 
are specified in advance and performance against 
those targets is measured strictly and softer, 
post-ante performance measurement, where 
performance over a period is evaluated in a more 
holistic fashion, incorporating more than just core 
performance indicators (Hoogenboezem & 
Hoogenboezem 2005). Some question the value of 
ex-ante performance targets (Vollaard 2006). Lawton 
(2005: 235) has stated that ‘inspection, regulatory, 
and performance regimes that focus on prescriptive 
target-setting and the technical application of 
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pre-determined metrics ignore the importance of 
judgement’.
Perhaps because policing lacks the scientific 
foundation to set truly meaningful and feasible hard 
targets, most police performance measurement 
schemes around the world include an inspectorate 
function, where performance results are discussed 
and analysed. In New Zealand, this is executed  
by the Performance Group (Police National 
Headquarters) and in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary. A problem with soft, post-ante 
performance measurement can develop when 
managers claim they are not responsible for poor 
performance, instead citing a range of causal 
environmental factors (Carter, Klein & Day 1992). 
While this may be partially accurate, it is unheard  
of for a manager to blame the environment for their 
good performance.
Another problem arising from prescriptive, ex-ante 
performance schemes is the potential for conflict in 
the applicability of performance targets at different 
levels of an organisation. For example, what may 
appear to be a priority (and thus a key performance 
target) at a national level may be largely irrelevant in 
a particular geographic locale (Loveday 2006), thus 
bringing into question whether performance in that 
field is a valid indicator in that place. At times, a 
performance indicator may be irrelevant not because 
it is a poor indicator, but rather because inadequate 
effort and analysis has been undertaken to convert 
that indicator into a meaningful measure at different 
hierarchical levels (and locations) of the organisation. 
Targets may also be deliberately unambitious—
perhaps because it is realised that simple indicators 
are inadequate for real accountability and therefore  
it is best to set them at a level likely to be achieved—
thus leading to suboptimal performance (Mackenzie 
& Hamilton-Smith 2011).
Related to the above dichotomy is the idea that 
performance measurement can include both 
accountability (whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’) and learning 
elements. Accountability is past-focused and 
identifies whether what has occurred is good, bad, 
or in-between; learning instead focuses on how 
future performance can be improved by drawing  
on lessons from the past (Braga & Moore 2003b). 
Learning is not something that police forces have 
traditionally done well, except in the more limited 
field of technological advancement (Bradley 2005; 
Lum 2009; Weisburd & Neyroud 2011).
In an effort to overcome several of the problems 
cited above, Braga and Moore (2003a) have posited 
a comprehensive approach to police performance 
measurement. They state that ‘controlling crime is 
the single most important core function of the police, 
(but) there are many other dimensions of performance 
that are valued’ (Braga & Moore 2003a: 10). As 
such, they feel that any performance scheme  
needs to incorporate seven dimensions:
•	 reducing crime and criminal victimisation;
•	 calling offenders to account;
•	 reducing fear and enhancing personal security;
•	 ensuring civility in public spaces (ordered liberty);
•	 using force and authority fairly, efficiently and 
effectively;
•	 using financial resources fairly, efficiently and 
effectively; and
•	 quality services/customer satisfaction (Braga  
& Moore 2003a).
Braga and Moore (2003a) believe that it is important 
to measure performance in all of these dimensions. 
Ignoring one (or several) dimensions is at best a 
failure to fully appreciate the complexity of police 
work and at worst a contributor to the types of 
perverse behaviour noted earlier. This approach is 
therefore a particularly detailed, balanced scorecard. 
It takes into account the multiple influences  
acting upon police forces and the way in which 
performance in one area can involve trade-offs  
in another. In the last few years, there has been  
a limited degree of increased attention to such 
multidimensional approaches to police performance 
and the inclusion of additional factors beyond crime 
rates (Carmona & Gronlund 2003; Cockcroft & 
Beattie 2009; Hughes, McLaughlin & Muncie 2001).
Others have suggested that one solution to the 
performance measurement problems noted above 
might be to first identify what works—also known  
as best practice—and then measure the degree  
of adherence to that best practice (Lum 2009; 
Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011). This might be 
seen as a quality compliance approach. While this 
would be exceptionally useful when first setting 
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quality standards, as will be noted later, it is potentially 
troublesome as an overall solution due to its self-
referential nature. It is also difficult to achieve,  
as Carter, Klein and Day (1992: 155) have noted, 
even in highly technical industries such as water 
management, where there is often clear scientific 
evidence (often lacking from the policing 
environment), ‘standard-setting is the result of  
a political process that has to weigh up what is  
both desirable and what is feasible’.
A standards-based approach might quickly ossify 
(Smith 1995a) or instead become detached from the 
outcomes it seeks to achieve if environmental factors 
change. If best practice is too prescriptive, then 
flexibility and innovation may also be harmed. A 
similar approach of measuring milestones against  
a particular plan is also valuable in part, but again 
cannot solve all problems due to its self-referential 
nature and the likelihood of measure fixation 
developing.
Performance in  
specialist policing
When one moves from the general to the 
specialist—to the field of technical and niche units, 
as noted earlier—the difficulties in measuring police 
performance become even greater. First, outcome 
measures—even simple measures such as crime 
rates—are usually irrelevant for technical units and 
difficult to assign to niche units. Even more than with 
generalist policing, specialist policing groups will 
have large co-dependencies with other agencies  
or parts of the organisation (Mackenzie & Hamilton-
Smith 2011); what is the ‘outcome’ of a fingerprint 
identification? Or, indeed, what is the outcome 
achieved by any technical unit? And what of 
counter-terrorism—if the measure is ‘terrorist 
attacks’ and the result is zero, how do we identify 
whether such was due to police actions rather  
than simple inactivity by terrorist groups? While the 
absence of activity can be reliably assumed to be  
at least partly related to police activity when there  
is a large enough sample size (such as crime rates; 
Vollaard 2006), when the sample size is a few 
incidents a year at most, the validity of assigning 
responsibility for any decrease (or increase) to police 
activities is more questionable.
The situation is often made even more difficult for 
niche units due to overlapping responsibilities. For 
example, AMCOS has primary responsibility for 
Level 2 and Level 3 organised crime in Auckland  
(as defined in the British National Intelligence Model; 
see National Centre for Policing Excellence 2005), 
but there are also District Organised Crime Units and 
a national Organised and Financial Crime Agency  
of New Zealand operating in the same space, albeit 
theoretically against different targets. If there were a 
reliable outcome indicator for the level of organised 
crime in Auckland, how could the respective effects 
of the different groups be calculated? The situation 
is the same in the United Kingdom and Australia, 
and especially so in the United States, where a 
range of metropolitan, state and federal agencies 
may all target the same range of organised criminal 
groups. Any simple outcome measurement of efforts 
against organised crime could therefore, at best, 
demonstrate the range of players involved and the 
overall effect of those actions; it could not, however, 
clearly identify the respective influence of those 
players. Carter, Klein and Day (1992: 32) have stated 
in relation to performance measurement that:
...the greater the complexity, the greater also is 
the scope for interdependence. The greater the 
interdependence, the more difficult it is to assign 
the ownership of performance to individual actors 
or agencies within the organisation.
In simple terms, technical units contribute to 
outcomes—but it is difficult to identify by how much. 
Niche units contribute to outcomes to a greater 
extent, but those results can often be lost amidst  
a much larger picture. Given these difficulties, it is 
the perspective of the authors that a meaningful 
specialist policing performance measurement 
framework should focus primarily (but not solely)  
on outputs and activities, with these two elements 
often blending into each other. This has the 
advantage of validity, as police have much more 
control over outputs than they do over outcomes 
(Dadds & Scheide 2000). Outputs and activities  
also have an inherent value in themselves (Braga & 
Moore 2003a, 2003b) and while there are problems 
with an output/activity-focused scheme, these can 
be mitigated to a certain respect, as later sections 
will show.
At the same time, where outcome measures can be 
validly assigned to specialist policing activities, they 
should be incorporated as part of a balanced 
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approach (Braga & Moore 2003a). However, this 
should only be done when the baseline of outputs 
and activities has been established; it is vital to 
develop the simpler elements of the framework 
before embarking on the more complex elements. 
This focus on outputs and activities is unavoidable 
given the current level of knowledge about the effect 
of police activities. It is therefore anticipated that in 
the future, given research initiatives like the Centre 
for AMCOS Lessons Learned, the framework can 
transition to one more focused on outcomes, but  
to do so now would be to put the conceptual cart 
before the horse.
There are further definitional conundrums to consider. 
For example, whether something is seen as an 
activity, output, or outcome will depend very much 
on who is doing the perceiving. As Blumstein and 
others have noted, police activities can be seen both 
as ends in themselves as well as contributors to 
other processes (Blumstein 1999; Braga & Moore 
2003a). To use an earlier example, a fingerprint 
section will view the process of analysing a 
fingerprint as an activity (occurring within the 
section), the number of processes completed as  
an output (a service provided to something external 
to the section) and the successful identification and 
provision of that identification to an investigative unit 
leading to an arrest, as an outcome (altering the 
environment external to the section). From the 
perspective of the police as a whole, however, the 
arrest is an output at best and perhaps might be 
seen as an activity. For them, the outcome will be 
any changes in the crime rate related to the crime 
type for which that person was arrested. For niche 
units, outcomes will likely be measured in terms of 
prosecutions.
The second great challenge in an output/activity-
focused framework is ensuring that the measures 
chosen are meaningful. If they are not meaningful, 
then the negative elements of performance 
measurement—particularly measure fixation and 
gaming—will swiftly emerge. Usually, an output-
based approach attaches quantity and quality 
elements to each output category. Timeliness, 
sometimes seen as separate, is better seen as  
a facet of both quantity and quality aspects, given 
that any quantity is measured over time; the simple 
quantity of any output gives one indication of 
timeliness over a particular period. More specific 
elements, such as response within a particular 
period, can be incorporated into quality standards.
It can be relatively easy to specify meaningful 
outputs, such as ‘the number of terminated drug 
operations per set standards’. Quality standards 
(perhaps focusing on best practice as noted earlier; 
Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011 then rest in a 
separate document, where they can be as detailed 
as required without making the performance 
framework unwieldy in itself. One potential approach 
to quality is to use a standards-based approach, 
similar to that used by the New Zealand Qualifications 
Authority; each particular level, that is ‘Excellence’  
or ‘A’, has a specific list of defining characteristics so 
the evaluator measures actual performance against 
those lists in identifying the standard achieved.  
This might then lead to comments such as seven 
A-Grade terminations, four B-Grade terminations 
and three C-Grade terminations.
A more sophisticated aspect of meaningfulness  
is identifying whether or not particular outputs are 
responsible for the achievement of outcomes (Flynn 
1986; Jackson 1993; Smith 1995b). There are at 
least three aspects to this:
•	 non-responsibility;
•	 differential success; and
•	 a lack of causality.
In short, non-responsibility involves a sub-component 
of a larger organisation delivering outputs that are 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the achievement of 
organisational outcomes, but which are intermediated 
through another sub-component before that 
outcome performance is achieved. The analogy of 
the ‘widget factory’ is useful. The factory produces 
the widgets (activity or output), but it is the sales 
staff that sell the widgets, gaining revenue (one 
outcome) and it is the overall structure of the 
company that determines profit (another outcome). 
One could easily have a situation where two 
companies produce widgets to the same standard 
and for the same cost, yet where one is profitable 
and the other is not due to differences in the quality 
of sales staff. Therefore, while widgets are partly 
causal to outcomes, they are not solely responsible. 
Holding the widget factory accountable for the overall 
performance of the company would be illogical 
(Flynn 1986). Similarly, in the delivery of particular 
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policing services, such as secondhand dealer 
checks, a lack of follow-up by other units can lead  
to a failure to achieve the desired outcome—in this 
case a decline in burglary rates.
Related to non-responsibility is the concept of 
differential success. This also involves the delivery of 
quality outputs coupled with a potential failure at the 
overall outcome level. The difference is that at least 
some outcome success is achieved, but only at a 
lower level; thus, there is differential performance. 
The Vietnam War is a prime example of this, where 
tactical victories (tactical outputs resulting in tactical 
outcomes) were not translated into strategic success 
(strategic outcomes) due to the absence of a coherent 
overall plan. This can be analogised to the police 
environment; terminated operations (tactical outputs) 
may affect drug availability in a particular locale 
(outcome success), but unless other groups also 
deliver quality services, then the overall outcome 
goal will not be achieved. One way of partly 
overcoming the problems of non-responsibility and 
differential success is to integrate activities, outputs 
and outcomes into a single plan, so that all of the 
contributors to overall performance are properly 
linked (Bratton 1999; Collier 2006; Mackenzie & 
Hamilton-Smith 2011; Smith 1995a). This approach 
is sometimes known as program logic (Duignan 2012).
The third issue, non-causality, is perhaps the most 
important of all and rests on limited knowledge  
of the link between outputs and outcomes. If a 
particular output X has no causal link with outcome 
Y, no matter how well we perform X, we will never 
achieve Y. It is these outputs that must be avoided 
at all costs—while the problems of non-responsibility 
and differential success can be overcome through 
better processes, non-causality can never be 
overcome. While there has been a substantial 
amount of research done on the causal link between 
police activities and the environment, there is no 
clear picture and no equivalent of the military’s 
principles of war; we are still largely in the dark 
(Bradley 2005; Lum 2009; Stone & Travis 2011; 
Weisburd & Neyroud 2011). Police officers may 
assume that a particular activity, such as foot 
patrols, may lead to a particular outcome, but may 
lack the evidence to show that this is so. It may well 
be that such outputs are unproductive and merely 
take resources away from other, more beneficial 
activities.
In some situations, outputs that are causal to 
outcome success can be delivered poorly. In the 
case of the widget factory where there is a high fault 
rate, responsibility rests with the output provider.  
For the police, that would be the specialist policing 
agency. This might occur when a fingerprint unit  
has poor laboratory standards, leading to very few 
fingerprints being identified. However, in many other 
situations, outcome failure is not the responsibility  
of the output provider due to the issues of non-
responsibility, differential success and non-causality 
noted above. Care must be taken to explore all  
of these issues before assigning blame for poor 
performance. Holding a manager accountable for  
an outcome when they do not control all of the 
elements contributing to that performance is illogical 
(Flynn 1986).
Overall, performance measurement for specialist 
policing is more difficult than for the police as a 
whole. Primarily, this is due to the fact that specialist 
policing provides specific services or outputs and  
is not primarily responsible for the achievement of 
policing outcomes. Any measurement framework 
must understand this and therefore focus on the 
output/activity level, while still remaining cognisant  
of the links between those outputs/activities and the 
outcomes they wish to achieve. It is also important 
to understand whether a seeming lack of correlation 
between the delivery of outputs and the achievement 
of outcome goals is actually due to the fact that 
those outputs are not causal or rather due to a 
shortcoming in overall strategy or structures.
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The current AMCOS Performance Management 
Framework is approximately three years old (see 
Appendix for framework). It was initiated early in 
2009 in response to a degree of criticism from within 
New Zealand Police as to the visibility of AMCOS 
activities. The rationale for its creation at the local 
level is succinctly expressed in the words of Sean 
Price, Chief Constable of Cleveland Police Force in 
England:
Performance management is an area where  
there is no single accepted model for the police 
service, and any such model or framework needs 
to be fit for purpose (Home Office 2008: np).
The framework rests on a simple concept—first, 
identify what is important and second, work out  
how to measure what is important (Braga & Moore 
2003a). Therefore, purpose determines the 
performance indicators chosen. The starting point 
for the framework was strategic guidance and 
specifically, the three Strategic Goals and associated 
outcomes listed in high-level New Zealand Police 
policy documents. From these, a number of outputs 
and activities were identified. Table 1 shows this first 
phase of classification.
The authors identified these contributory outputs 
and activities through an eclectic mix of literature 
The AMCOS performance 
management framework
Table 1 Initial top level derivation of performance categories
Outputs Activities
Evidence-based policing Intelligence management
Knowledge management
Timely and effective responses Deploy to risk
Manage organised and serious crime investigations
Thorough investigations Forensic support
Strategic collaboration Manage government relationships
Manage agency relationships
Liaise with other agencies
Source: APMF 2009
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review, first-principles reasoning and consultation. 
This process of linking outputs to outcomes would 
not have passed scientific muster, but was the best 
possible at the time (given resource and time 
constraints) and as is noted below, has been 
substantially improved already. As such, the 
framework began as an output/activity framework 
linked to outcomes. This was done for the reasons 
already cited earlier in the paper on the difficulty of 
developing useful outcome measures for specialist 
policing activities without being overly prescriptive 
(see Vollaard 2006).
The value of such a strategic derivation seems 
obvious, but it appears to be relatively rare within 
police, although it is common in militaries. At  
least within New Zealand Police (and presumably 
overseas, given the literature surveyed), performance 
measures are largely presented in decontextualised 
fashion, separated from the strategic goals the 
organisation pursues except in the broadest possible 
terms, such as ‘crime reduction’. There is seldom  
a clear hierarchical chain from outcome through 
enabler through output, activity and input. This 
separation makes it difficult to identify why a 
particular measure has been chosen and therefore 
divorces frontline practitioners from the strategic 
outcomes that should be their overall goal. The 
authors felt that an essential element in ensuring  
that any performance framework is understood  
and well-supported, as well as in ensuring that the 
framework remains outwardly focused rather than 
self-referential, was to make explicit the contribution 
to and links between low-level measures, and 
operational and strategic-level goals and objectives.
Former Commissioner of the New York Police 
Department, William Bratton, has talked about the 
value of a ‘decentralized management system with 
strong strategic guidance at the top’ (Bratton 1999: 
16); the same applies to performance measurement. 
At the national level, the value is in identifying 
strategic performance areas, outcomes, impacts 
and Key Result Areas. However, this is not enough; 
lower levels must then analyse those high-level 
elements and distil from them the key measures 
relevant to their own business. The Home Office 
Police Standards Unit in England and Wales has  
said exactly this when it emphasised the importance 
of varying performance frameworks across—and  
by extension, within—forces to reflect differing 
circumstances (Home Office Police Standards Unit 
2004). Alongside the top-down, strategic goal-driven 
process, there was a bottom-up element. This  
was based on an analysis of the literature, which 
suggested that performance schemes built from  
the bottom-up—based on the ‘true nature’ of police 
work—had value (Carter, Klein & Day 1992; van 
Sluis, Cachet & Ringeling 2008). Flynn (1986: 392) 
has stated that ‘at their best, performance measures 
are developed by managers themselves to enable 
them to do their job better’. Stone and Travis (2011: 
19), discussing professionalism in policing, note that 
‘careful analysis of local problems and the custom 
crafting of solutions continue to be necessary’; the 
development of a performance framework is indeed 
a solution to a particular set of problems relating to 
accountability and learning.
One quality of locally developed frameworks is that 
they are more likely to be perceived by those being 
measured as being focused on learning and 
improvement, rather than being strict accountability 
tools—‘sticks’ to use a colloquial term. Willis, 
Anderson and Homel (2011: 4) have noted:
measurement systems designed to focus on 
performance improvements (as opposed to 
instruments of control) are much more easily 
accepted than systems designed exclusively  
for accountability purposes.
This is a particular problem given police traditional 
culture, which has often been seen as a challenge 
for New Public Management-style techniques  
and the accountability that accompanies those 
techniques (Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall 2004; 
Fleming & Lafferty 2000). By allowing staff to 
participate in the development of the framework,  
not only would the framework be better, but staff 
would also gain a sense of ownership and hopefully 
engage with it at a deeper level (Loveday 2006). 
Developing the scheme with input from the frontline 
also ensured that the scheme would remain focused 
on instrumental improvements to performance, 
rather than merely being a symbolic initiative 
designed to gain legitimacy for AMCOS (Roy & 
Séguin 2000). It was also anticipated that such  
an organic, bottom-up approach would help avoid 
neo-Taylorism—a separation between management 
(measurers) and workers (doers)—developing 
(Loveday 2006), which was felt to be likely if an 
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externally developed framework was imposed 
without consultation.
Another benefit of developing the framework locally 
was agility. Any changes could be quickly made  
at the AMCOS level, involving only 300 staff, rather 
than having to wait for movement at the national 
level, where there is a much larger bureaucracy. This 
would help make the framework particularly flexible 
and responsive.
The bottom-up element of developing the framework 
involved visiting all AMCOS units and discussing 
their work. From this, key activities and potential 
measures could be identified, and just as importantly, 
things that need not be measured could also  
be identified (Carter, Klein & Day 1992). These 
discussions were vital for two reasons:
•	 they helped ensure that any measures chosen 
were meaningful to the unit; and
•	 they also helped the unit understand why the 
framework was being developed.
As might be expected, there was some minor 
concern initially about ‘counting everything’, but 
AMCOS staff have increasingly become more 
engaged with the framework, seeing it as the  
best mechanism for expressing the degree of work 
that they do. Care was taken to ensure that the 
measures chosen were parsimonious.
The top-down and bottom-up elements were then 
blended together into an integrated classification 
scheme of AMCOS performance measures. Where 
the two elements met, there was a process of 
creative destruction and rationalisation. The core 
defining characteristic of each low-level element was 
identified and it was then placed against what was 
deemed to be the most fitting higher level category. 
At times, the nature of the work done on the ground 
led to a slight re-definition of higher level categories, 
which being based on inductive reasoning sometimes 
failed to account for the evidence. If a higher level 
category seemed to have no available measures,  
it was left empty for the time being. An Output 
Dictionary was produced and disseminated, 
covering the scheme in its entirety. Table 2 shows  
a simplification of that output schema.
Over time, the Performance Framework has evolved 
(see Table 3). One key change has been a move 
away from Police Strategic Goals to Police Output 
Classes as the highest level of the framework (New 
Zealand Police 2009). This was done due to an 
increased focus at the national level on those 
outputs, and has had the benefit of forcing further 
analysis of the various measures and reconsideration 
of their best location within the framework. As a 
result, the Output Dictionary has been revised and 
updated several times. An example of the types of 
specific measures that exist under each broader 
activity category is shown in Table 4.
In developing the framework, thought was also given 
as to how to gauge the framework’s success. Here, 
the thinking of Bititci et al. (2006) was crucial—is  
the performance scheme being used to regularly 
monitor performance and make decisions, and  
do staff see the system as valuable? Given the 
long-term nature of most AMCOS activities, it  
was intended that holistic formal reports would be 
produced every six months, with some performance 
indicators presented on a monthly basis. As noted 
further below, the framework is now transitioning to 
a quarterly tempo. It was also decided to survey staff 
on their opinion of the framework. The results of 
those surveys are covered later in the penultimate 
section on challenges and successes.
Table 2 Example of low-level measures identified and linked to higher level categories
Top level Intelligence management
Intermediate level Basic products Analytical products Field intelligence processes
Specific measures Notings Strategic assessments Gang events attended
Operation-specific support Tactical assessments Other gang contacts
Problem profiles Community events attended
Subject/offender profiles
Thematic assessments
Source: APMF 2009
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Overall, by developing the framework internally 
within AMCOS, it was felt that several key benefits 
would result. First, it would ensure that the framework 
was accurate, meaningful and engaged with the 
unique nature of specialist policing. Second, it would 
ensure that staff would gain a sense of ownership 
over the scheme and thus it would be supported. 
Next, it would ensure that the scheme remained 
focused on real performance, rather than merely 
symbolism. Finally, it would allow the framework to 
be flexible and responsive to changing circumstances. 
As a result of all the above, it was felt that the 
framework would overcome many of the challenges 
noted earlier in relation to performance measurement 
in general, be less vulnerable to perverse behaviour 
and therefore be a better tool for management.
The performance 
framework in detail
The value of the AMCOS Performance Framework 
comes primarily from its overall structure, rather  
than its individual components. These individual 
measures are, for the most part, not unique. 
However, when linked with other measures and 
activities, one gains a better appreciation of the 
quality and quantity of specialist policing services 
delivered by AMCOS and their potential impact on 
policing outcomes.
In the following sections, the performance measures 
are described according to four specific areas that 
Table 3 Simplified representation of current derivation of activity categories from high-level guidance
Output classes Specific APMF activity categories
Policy advice and ministerial servicing Intelligence management
Other knowledge management
General crime prevention services Gather community intelligence
Strategic collaboration
Communicate knowledge outside police
Code of conduct activities
Specific crime prevention services and 
maintenance of order
Specialist operational support
Manage VIP and WitPro Ops
Manage civil emergency responses
Police primary response management Specialist operational support
Investigations Forensic support
Active investigation processes
Terminated investigation processes
Covert support
Drug lab services
Case resolution and support to the judicial 
process
Criminal case resolution
Road safety program n/a
Note: Framework has been modified to allow its replication here
Source: APMF 2011
Table 4 Simplified representation of measures linked to higher level activities
Drug lab services
Deployment to suspected clan labs Clan labs dismantled Location assessments High-value chemicals seized
Source: APMF 2011
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fall within the broader concept of technical and  
niche units introduced earlier—forensics, operations 
support, investigations and intelligence. Before 
discussing those specific measures, however, it is 
useful to first consider some performance measures 
common to all AMCOS units, measures that are 
among some of the most innovative in the entire 
framework.
As was noted earlier, professionalism in policing 
rests upon a commitment to continuous learning 
and innovation, a willingness to reflect, and thus the 
creation and sharing of knowledge (Bradley 2005; 
Stone & Travis 2011). It is an area that police 
agencies have seldom been good at (Pendleton 
2005). One common set of performance measures 
for all AMCOS units relates to the sharing of 
knowledge, both within and outside police, and  
the maintenance of good working relationships with 
governmental, non-governmental, and international 
partners and agencies. Knowledge sharing cannot 
and perhaps should not, be easily quantified; the 
number of meetings attended may be a simple 
indicator, but it lacks meaning. Rather, performance 
in these areas is reported on in a descriptive, 
qualitative manner, which provides a rich source  
of data for evaluation and comparison.
Another set of common measures relates to training 
and development activities, including levels of 
compliance with required training categories.  
It would be useful in future to expand this to 
something akin to a Military Essential Tasks List, 
which is a detailed method of identifying the level of 
preparedness and capability of a particular military 
unit (Global Security.org 2011; Tritten 1997).
Key to the learning and innovation aspect of the 
framework is the Centre for AMCOS Lessons 
Learned (CALL; Alach 2010a). CALL is an evaluation 
system that closely examines AMCOS activities, 
either individual operations or a closely linked series 
of occurrences. As a performance measurement 
tool, CALL is too resource intensive to be applied to 
all activities—a single investigative operation CALL 
report can take a month and AMCOS terminates 
more than 50 investigative operations a year—but it 
provides a useful adjunct to the broader, more easily 
reported elements of the framework. In particular, it 
contributes to our understanding of the relationship 
between outputs and outcomes (Boba 2003; 
Bradley 2005; Braga & Moore 2003a; Haberman & 
King 2011; Hughes, McLaughlin & Muncie 2001; Lum 
2009; Vollaard 2006; Weisburd & Neyround 2011).
Because of this, CALL is vital to the future 
simplification and enhancement of the performance 
framework, not only for AMCOS and specialist 
policing, but also for New Zealand Police and  
law enforcement in general. This is because, as 
understanding of the linkages between outputs and 
outcomes improves, there is less worry about actual 
outcome measures. This may seem counterintuitive, 
so deserves further explanation.
Let us consider an outcome goal, Y. Measuring Y 
may be difficult, expensive and result in massive 
fluctuations over short time periods, thus making 
frequent measurement difficult. However, if we  
can be confident in a link between output X and 
outcome Y, then we can focus our measurements 
on output X, which is likely to be far easier to do, 
less expensive and more amenable to frequent 
reporting. It will still be necessary to occasionally 
confirm that the output–outcome relationship 
remains, but this can be done for auditing and 
reassurance reasons, rather than strictly for 
performance measurement. As such, the more 
CALL does to link specialist policing outputs with 
policing outcomes, the greater the future benefits  
for performance measurement are likely to be, both 
in effectiveness and efficiency.
Forensics performance measures
Forensic units fall squarely within the concept of 
technical units raised earlier, where the problem  
is that while contributory to major police outputs  
and outcomes, they are not responsible for such 
outcomes. As such, the challenge is to identify how 
much they have contributed and how important that 
contribution has been to overall results. The AMCOS 
forensics group consists of:
•	 forensic imaging (photography and videography);
•	 fingerprints; and
•	 criminal profiling.
AMCOS once included a DNA collection squad,  
but that has since been disestablished; however, 
performance measures for that squad were 
developed and are mentioned below.
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Forensic imaging
For forensic imaging, performance measures focus 
on the number of jobs (outputs) attended where 
photographs are taken and/or video is collected  
and analysed, for both standard jobs (attended 
when resources are deployed per a standard roster) 
and emergency jobs, where an immediate response 
is required, such as a major motorway accident. It  
was felt that focusing on jobs was the best way of 
identifying the overall impact of the unit, rather than 
focusing on (for example) the number of pictures 
taken. The next phase for forensic imaging will be  
to shift towards some outcome (from the perspective 
of the unit) measures by examining courtroom and 
evidential results, such as the number of cases 
supported by photographic evidence and potentially 
even the number of cases where photographic 
evidence was vital to success. Gathering the data 
for these next-level measures will be very difficult, as 
cases are the responsibility of investigators separate 
to the forensic imaging unit.
Fingerprint unit
The fingerprint unit already had the basics of  
a performance measurement scheme in place, 
focusing on the life cycle of a print:
•	 the number of cases received (an indicator  
of workload);
•	 the number processed/finalised (an indicator  
of available resources);
•	 the number retained (an indicator of sample 
quality); and
•	 the number of identifications made, both via a 
computerised system and also via any priority 
suspect list provided by investigators.
The next step was to include the number of partial 
court case files prepared by fingerprint officers, who 
unlike forensic imagers are often required to testify 
themselves. Other additional measures included the 
number of crime scenes attended, as well as the 
actual number of physical exhibits examined. In the 
future, as with forensic imaging, new measures will 
be developed to identify the success rate of cases 
with fingerprint evidence against those without, as 
well as identify changes in efficiency (the number of 
cases processed correlated against staff numbers), 
as well as highlight areas of external concern (if the 
number of cases retained drops, it may indicate 
poor work at crime scenes by first attenders).
Criminal profiling unit
The criminal profiling unit was treated similarly to the 
forensic imaging unit, in that its primary performance 
measures were requests received (demand indicator) 
and products produced (primary outputs). It was 
decided not to split ‘products produced’ into 
separate categories, largely due to the fact that there 
is no formal typology of profiling products and as 
such, it is easier to merely list overall production  
and then describe the details separately. A second 
set of performance measures relate to the ViCLAS 
database system, the projected centrepiece of  
the unit into the future. These show inputs into the 
systems as well as outputs (potential linkage reports, 
both successful and unsuccessful). The next step will 
involve greater focus on courtroom results, which as 
might be noted, will be a common factor in future 
performance measurement across all forensics groups. 
It is likely that an in-depth CALL report will be required 
to develop the analytical basis for such indicators.
DNA collection squad
Performance measures for the now-disestablished 
DNA unit were simple—the number of samples 
taken (both voluntary and involuntary), and the 
number of offenders and crimes linked to those 
samples. Had the DNA unit remained part of 
AMCOS, future work would have focused on  
the evidential value of identifications.
Specialist operational support  
performance measures
Specialist operational services also fall within the 
technical unit category. From a thematic, if not 
organisational perspective, AMCOS has four full-time 
specialist operations groups:
•	 the VIP protection squad;
•	 the maritime unit;
•	 the dog section; and
•	 the air support unit.
It also has a number of part-time groups whose 
performance measures have not received the same 
degree of attention.
VIP protection squad
From a VIP protection perspective, the most obvious 
performance measure is a negative one, namely nil 
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harm to VIPs under protection. However, this is an 
unsatisfactory measure, because the absence of 
harm cannot be reliably construed as resulting from 
the presence of protection personnel unless the 
outcomes can be compared against the outcomes 
for a control group of VIPs who are not protected. 
Nor can the occurrence of harm automatically be 
assumed to be the result of poor VIP protection (ie 
non-responsibility). For example, someone shooting 
a VIP from a range of 1,500m with a military-grade 
sniper rifle is simply outside the ability of close-
quarters VIP protection personnel to prevent.
Given this problem, outputs are the focus of VIP 
protection performance measures, namely the 
number of operations undertaken (this incorporates 
the fact that an operation is defined by particular 
quality standards, such as the publication of an 
operations order and adherence to standard 
operating procedures) and the number of person-
hours of protection provided. There is no easy way 
to improve the measures in terms of outcomes.  
As such, any future enhancements of measures  
for VIP protection may borrow from Mackenzie  
and Hamilton-Smith (2011) and instead seek to 
‘benchmark’ the unit against overseas best practice, 
which presumably has been derived from the 
evaluation of protection failures.
Maritime unit
The maritime unit presented great difficulties in 
identifying measures due to the sheer multiplicity  
of roles performed by the unit. It acts as a general 
duty response capability (in New Zealand Police 
terminology, a ‘marine I-car’), a search-and-rescue 
(SAR) manager, an investigator into stolen outboards 
and similar equipment, and also works with other 
government agencies on lengthy, offshore patrols. 
As such, its performance measures are also varied. 
Inspiration from naval and air force performance 
schemes around the world led to the inclusion of  
sea hours as a measure. The number of jobs 
attended is another key measure, as is the number 
of people apprehended at or near the sea; this latter 
element therefore allows for the measuring of results 
from investigations into stolen maritime equipment. 
Further measures examine seizures of weapons and 
drugs, the first of which is particularly important given 
that foreign sailors usually have limited understanding 
of New Zealand weapon laws. The number of SAR 
operations managed, and people located and 
recovered is another performance measure. Lastly, 
the soft performance measures relating to liaison 
with other agencies are vital to the Maritime Unit  
and thus receive substantial qualitative description.
Dog section
Similarly to the fingerprint section, the dog section 
already had a performance system in place, focusing 
on deployments to jobs (divided into those in which 
a dog was used and those in which it was not), the 
number of apprehensions and arrests, the number 
of incidents cleared and the total number of offences 
cleared. While these measures are similar, they  
each have a subtly different nuance and therefore 
changes in their inter-relationships over time can be 
particularly informative. Another set of performance 
measures examine the number of times specialist 
detector dogs (drugs, firearms, explosives and 
bodies) have been deployed and is logically followed 
by measures of the quantity and type of drugs and 
weapons seized.
Air support unit
The air support unit (ASU) has a clear role, which 
made development of performance measures 
relatively simple. As with the dog section, the 
primary output is the number of deployments  
to jobs, followed by the number of flying hours 
provided. The next group of measures can be 
regarded as outcomes from the ASU perspective 
and include the number of offenders detected by 
both day and night, in both raw terms and also as  
a percentage of total deployments. This measure 
shows changes over time in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the ASU and can stimulate more 
in-depth consideration of the causes behind any 
changes. The final performance measure for the  
unit concerns the number of times that the ASU  
has acted as a personnel carrier and deployed a  
unit such as the Special Tactics Group.
Next steps in developing specialist 
operational support performance measures
The next stage for both air support and dog 
performance measures will be a greater focus  
on outcomes and in particular, the added value  
of the two units. With a large enough sample size, 
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the difference in detection rates between live 
burglary (or other live criminal events, such as armed 
robbery) occurrences with and without air support 
can be identified; a similar calculation could be done 
for the dog section. While it is anecdotal, information 
received when the ASU briefly deployed to 
Christchurch in the aftermath of the recent 
earthquakes indicated that its influence may actually 
have been greater than is commonly perceived in 
Auckland; familiarity may well have bred a certain 
degree of contempt. Something akin to military-style 
Operational Analysis may be required to model the 
optimum mix of general duties branch staff, dog 
units and air support over a full range of policing 
scenarios. This might also include modelling the 
impact of advanced technologies, in that enhanced 
sensors and data links might provide a quantum 
leap in the degree of value provided by any sort  
of aerial platform.
For the other part-time operational units—SAR, 
specialist search, negotiation, emergency 
management and armed response—performance 
measures are focused on primary outputs, such as 
the number of operations undertaken and number  
of person-hours provided, as well as a small element 
of outcome focus in terms of drugs and weapons 
seized and the number of people located.
Intelligence performance measures
The final component of the technical unit category 
consists of intelligence units. The AMCOS intelligence 
performance framework is posited on Crous’ (2010) 
two-fold typology of the internal activities of 
intelligence units (activities/outputs) and the effect  
of those activities (outcomes). The former, which 
primarily comprises intelligence products, is simple 
to measure. The New Zealand Police National 
Intelligence Centre has already set out definitions 
and quality standards for a range of analytical 
products and as such, it is easy to simply count  
the number of each type of report produced during  
a particular reporting period. Also measured 
quantitatively is the number of intelligence notings  
(a raw intelligence product) produced. Other output 
measures include the number of investigative 
operations that provided organic intelligence 
support, where an intelligence analyst brings their 
specific skillset into the investigation team.
The next step in measuring the internal aspect of 
intelligence performance will involve more closely 
tracking the eight fundamental elements often seen 
as central to good intelligence practice (Crous 2010):
•	 executive leadership;
•	 intelligence leadership;
•	 commitment;
•	 collaboration, coordination and partnerships;
•	 tasking and coordination;
•	 collection management;
•	 analytical capabilities; and
•	 training and education.
This is not performance measurement in the way 
described in the rest of the paper and so will not  
be described further here.
The second aspect of intelligence performance 
measurement focuses on outcomes and specifically, 
the difference that formal intelligence support has 
made in terms of outcomes for the police as a whole 
(Crous 2010). This is a difficult task and one that 
requires a substantial quantity of data that is  
not currently available; as such, this part of the 
performance scheme is as yet dormant. It is not 
enough to merely show that an intelligence-led 
operation has good results; this does not validly 
separate out the value of intelligence from that of 
other policing contributors. Ideally, intelligence-led 
and non-intelligence-led operations undertaken by 
units that are otherwise similar would be compared. 
Such comparative evaluations would help identify 
the relative utility of formal intelligence support and 
processes compared with informal, traditional 
approaches. There would also be a place for specific 
identification of those occurrences where intelligence 
made the crucial difference between success and 
failure.
Such a specific and focused approach to intelligence 
performance measurement is possible within 
AMCOS, as it would be easy in a relatively small 
group to either provide or not provide formal 
intelligence support to squads that are otherwise 
similar in terms of experience and expertise, and 
then evaluate the results. It would be difficult on a 
larger scale; in such cases it might be more useful  
to conduct a large scale evaluation of crime rates 
before and after the introduction of intelligence-led 
processes, corrected for other factors.
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Once the impact that intelligence processes have 
had on operational outcomes has been identified, 
the next step is to identify the costs involved and 
thus identify the benefit-to-cost ratio of formal 
intelligence support. Anything less than this would 
give only a partial answer to the question of how 
formal intelligence contributes to policing outcomes.
Investigations performance measures
For the most part, developing a performance 
framework for forensics, specialist operational units 
and intelligence units—using the earlier typology, 
technical units—was relatively easy. Almost all had  
a good base of existing activity and output measures 
that could be better aligned with strategic guidance 
and combined into a coherent, holistic scheme and 
that led easily into potential outcome measures. 
However, much greater difficulties were encountered 
with the specialist investigations components 
focused on drugs, organised crime and national 
security targets (niche units using the earlier typology).
As noted earlier, measuring performance in this field 
is difficult due to the lack of agreed definitions and 
reliable data (Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011). 
Because of the relatively small number of such 
investigations compared with overall crime rates  
and investigations, statistical approaches lack some 
validity when measuring outcome effects; variations 
in operation numbers are much more likely to 
represent the level of police attention rather than the 
actual level of organised crime, for example. In drug 
law enforcement, existing mixtures of activity, output 
and outcome measures from varying perspectives 
(police and government) have led to a distinct lack  
of clarity (Willis, Anderson & Homel 2011) and limited 
progress towards the identification of any sort of 
best practice in terms of performance measurement.
It was decided that, as a start, the performance 
scheme for this area would focus on outputs and 
more specifically on operations. The term operation 
is commonly used to describe proactive investigations 
targeting a particular group of drug/organised 
criminals and thus had the value of common 
understanding. The next step was to divide operations 
into two types, borrowing from the British National 
Intelligence Model:
•	 Level 1 local operations; and
•	 Level 2/3 complex and organised investigations 
(HMIC 1997; National Centre for Policing 
Excellence 2005).
Level 1 operations are the vast majority of criminal 
investigations, involving small-scale criminality in  
a geographically focused area, whereas Level 2 
involves cross-border offending and Level 3 involves 
serious, national and organised offending. Initially, a 
trifold division into Levels 1, 2, and 3 was attempted, 
but whereas distinguishing between Level 1 and  
2 was relatively easy, distinguishing Level 2 from  
Level 3 was immensely difficult. As such, the core 
measurement for investigation teams is the number 
of Level 1 and Level 2/3 operations active as at  
the performance reporting date and the number  
of operations terminated (arrests made) during the 
preceding reporting period. The ratio between active 
and terminated operations in turn provides some 
information about the ‘chunkiness’ of investigation 
workloads. Linked to these primary outputs are 
measures relating to the number of arrests made, 
the quantity and type of drugs seized, and the 
quantity and type of weapons seized.
An outcome measure derived from the quantity  
and type of drugs seized is the amount of social 
harm to New Zealand avoided. This relies on an 
independently developed Drug Harm Index, which 
uses econometric analysis to arrive at a quantification 
of drug harm (BERL 2008). Another outcome 
measure used intermittently is the post-operation 
disruption assessment (Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 
2011). These are assessments carried out once an 
operation has terminated that evaluate the impact 
that a particular operation had on the criminal 
environment, based on intelligence gathered during 
the termination and post-termination phase. 
Essentially the police equivalent of the military ‘Battle 
Damage Assessment’ (Diehl & Sloan 2005), these 
assessments are extremely valuable, but time 
consuming.
A next group of outputs in this area relate to judicial 
processes. They cover the number of trials completed 
during a reporting period, as well as the number  
of trials being actively prepared for. The number  
of witnesses managed during the period is also 
measured.
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Future performance measures for investigative units 
will focus on two key elements—outcome harm 
reduction and investigative efficiency. In the  
first element, the primary focus will be better 
understanding the impact that police activities have 
on the availability of drugs (Willis, Anderson & Homel 
2011). As such, substantial data on the price, purity 
and availability of various illicit drugs in the Auckland 
region will need to be gathered (Mackenzie & 
Hamilton-Smith 2011). A framework that has been 
developed in Australia (see Willis, Anderson & Homel 
2011) appears to be an excellent base to build from, 
although in requiring a substantial amount of data 
from non-police agencies, it will require close 
coordination with information sharing efforts at  
the national level. If resources allow, more analysis 
into other effects of organised crime will also be 
undertaken, such as corruption and distortion of 
markets.
Investigative efficiency and quality is an area of 
performance that seems to have been largely 
ignored in the literature. This seems rather odd,  
as poor investigative techniques can have multiple 
negative effects, including wrongful convictions, 
wrongful arrests, avoidable acquittals and false 
prosecutions (Canadian Police College Council  
of Investigative Excellence 2004). These can, in  
turn, lead to Commissions of Inquiry and even the 
payment of substantial compensation to those  
who have been wronged (Canadian Police College 
Council of Investigative Excellence 2004). It therefore 
seems essential to factor in investigative efficiency, 
perhaps in the form of compliance with quality 
standards, into the future investigative performance 
framework (Braga & Moore 2003a). This may involve 
formally identifying some principles or key elements 
of investigative excellence (Canadian Police College 
Council of Investigative Excellence 2004) and then 
randomly auditing a number of cases at any one 
time to identify the degree to which actual practice 
matches best practice. There would thus be a 
requirement for continual research and analysis to 
ensure that any best practice criteria remain 
accurate and relevant.
Investigation support components also require 
performance measurement. Informant management 
is measured in a number of ways. At the first level  
of complexity are some basic activity measures, 
such as the number of informants recruited and 
registered. The primary outputs measured are 
intelligence releases. In the near future, an effort will 
be made to trace the impact that informant-derived 
intelligence has on investigations, a form of outcome 
measurement.
Other covert capabilities, such as technical and 
surveillance support, are also measured on the  
basis of outputs—Level 1 and Level 2/3 operations 
supported, and the total number of person-hours  
of support provided. As with informant management, 
the next stage of performance measurement for 
these units will be to identify the impact that they 
have had on investigative success through 
comparisons with operations in which such support 
was not provided.
A last set of measures covered under the investigative 
section could just as easily have been discussed 
under the section on intelligence. This set relates to 
intelligence gathering activities, also known as field 
intelligence, such as attending gang or community 
events. At this stage, these involve simple activity 
measures only and it is difficult to identify how these 
measures could be developed further.
Future development  
of the framework
There are several ways the AMCOS Performance 
Framework might be enhanced as a whole, above 
and beyond the individual enhancements noted 
above. Before describing these potential 
enhancements, it is important to briefly reiterate why 
a relatively small unit (300 out of 12,000 total staff in 
New Zealand Police) needs to develop and improve 
its own framework and how doing so counters many 
of the difficulties related to performance 
measurement.
As noted earlier, one of the values in developing 
performance frameworks internally is creating a 
sense of ownership (Loveday 2006). Another is 
meaningfulness. This is particularly the case for 
AMCOS, which is unique within New Zealand Police; 
while centrally developed measures focusing on 
crime rates and resolutions may be relevant across 
the 12 general purpose Police Districts, they are less 
so for AMCOS. Local development can also ensure 
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that managers involved in the production of the 
framework are more aware of the potential for those 
being measured to engage in perverse behaviour 
(Loveday 2005) and can intervene to prevent this 
occurring.
The next evolution of the AMCOS Performance 
Framework will be focused on enhancing cohesion, 
clarity and outcomes. Good performance 
measurement is facilitated by a coherent strategy 
(Collier 2006; Home Office Police Standards Unit 
2004; Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith 2011; Smith 
1995a) and AMCOS is already working towards 
aligning and integrating performance measurement 
into its business planning, project management  
and risk management frameworks, using a program 
logic approach. The end goal is therefore a centrally 
directed, but locally managed, performance 
framework based on core strategic goals, which  
is integrated into planning and project management 
processes. Such a scheme is hoped to:
provide the integrated management framework 
necessary to achieve the output and outcome 
performance required to fulfil organisational goals 
and objectives (Barrett 2000: 64).
Once fully implemented, the framework will enable 
true professionalism by facilitating learning from the 
past and thus improving the future. There will be 
enhanced clarity and accountability, as managers will 
only be evaluated against the performance indicators 
they have agreed to in the ex-ante planning process 
(Flynn 1986). It is also hoped to better link performance 
indicators with managerial incentives and controls, 
further clarifying expectations (Smith 1990). 
Internally, a truly integrated and meaningful 
performance measurement system may even lead to 
a more participative and consultative management 
style (Bititci et al. 2006), as managers continually 
seek information and insight into the reasons for 
changes in performance.
In identifying meaningful objectives for the planning 
process, the military-derived concept of Effects 
Based Operations (EBO) could be particularly useful 
(Alach 2010b). EBO is about identifying the effects 
required to achieve a particular goal, then tracing 
back the causal chains required to achieve those 
effects. As such, it rests on inductive reasoning 
backed up by research. By applying an EBO 
approach to any AMCOS strategy, the causal  
chains required to reach desired outcomes (strategic 
goals modified to the AMCOS geographic sphere) 
could be identified. These chains could then be 
turned into tiers of performance measures, some  
at the outcome/strategy level, the majority at the 
output/activity level and even some at the input level.
For example, one desired outcome for AMCOS 
might be reduced use of methamphetamine across 
Auckland. The effects required to achieve this might 
be:
•	 fewer first time users;
•	 a higher price per pure gram;
•	 reduced availability;
•	 a higher risk to consumers;
•	 improved social happiness; and
•	 better drug treatment.
From this, AMCOS-specific measures might be 
identified, such as increasing the price per pure 
gram by a certain percentage, seizing a certain 
amount of the drug and arresting a certain number 
of suppliers.
It is intended that the framework will be continually 
reviewed to ensure that measures do not become 
ossified. One mechanism of balancing the need  
for consistency (and thus comparability) over time 
with the need to be flexible has already been noted 
earlier—the use of quality standards. For example, 
the measure might remain ‘number of operations 
terminated’, but the standards used to define an 
operation might be modified to adapt to evolving 
circumstances.
Core to the future review of the framework will  
be rigorous analysis and comparative research 
undertaken by CALL. CALL will be able to build from 
post-operation assessments and identify elements 
of best practice. This will assist in the development 
of standards against which to evaluate future 
operations. CALL will also evaluate the outcomes 
achieved by particular activities and as such, help 
clarify the relationship between activities, outputs 
and outcomes, potentially simplifying and enhancing 
the performance measurement framework.
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The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss  
the experiences of the authors in developing the 
framework and identify some lessons that might  
be of value for others working in the field in either 
developing or critiquing similar frameworks.  
The theoretical challenges that abound within 
performance management have already been 
touched on; in this section, the focus will be more  
on the detail of implementing such a framework. 
Some key points should be noted:
•	 Management support. Any move towards 
innovation in performance management (which, 
by extension, may lead to criticism of units and 
staff) requires strong support from management. 
The authors were fortunate to have an innovative, 
future-oriented manager who was supportive of 
the new performance framework from the outset. 
Without support from the top, it is probable that 
staff would have been far less willing to provide 
the data required to construct the framework. 
When units delayed their reporting, communication 
from the Commander quickly cleared any 
roadblocks. The Commander was also supportive 
of the constant development and enhancement of 
the framework, rather than demanding that it stay 
in a fixed form. The support of the Commander 
was also vital to the success of the Centre for 
AMCOS Lessons Learned, a concept that seemed 
foreign (and perhaps a little frightening) to the staff 
being evaluated. Again, strong leadership and 
clear communication brought staff on board.
•	 A sound foundation. The Performance Framework 
was built on some existing work done between 
2005 and 2007 to enhance AMCOS intelligence 
structures. As intelligence systems and processes 
were improved, there was a steady breakdown  
of information silos, which in turn, led to a greater 
focus on sharing knowledge and information. 
Without this initial work, the barriers encountered 
by the performance framework would have been 
much greater. The work on intelligence helped 
introduce staff to the concept of disruption, thus 
making the incorporation of this into the Centre  
for AMCOS Lessons Learned easier.
•	 Consultation. Too often, performance frameworks 
seem to be developed in an ‘ivory tower’, 
separate from the true nature of work (the authors 
grant that given their academic backgrounds, 
some readers may find the above comment to be 
unintentionally humorous). The authors countered 
this by visiting as many units as they could and 
talking through the issues with frontline staff.  
To ensure that staff feedback was continually 
incorporated, a survey of opinions about the 
framework was held at the end of 2009, after  
the first two performance reports had been 
completed. The framework was rated 3.4 out  
of 4 for usefulness and 3.1 out of 4 in terms of 
accuracy. Findings from this survey were then 
used to improve the next performance cycle. A 
On developing  
the framework
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more recent survey (in 2011) asked for opinions 
on the latest version of the performance 
framework, now that it has been partially 
integrated into the planning process. This time, 
the framework was rated 9 out of 10 for accuracy, 
but only 6.8 out of 10 in terms of real value in 
measuring performance. This lower score is 
interesting. It is hypothesised that staff, having 
been exposed to a more advanced mechanism of 
measuring performance for two years, now have 
heightened expectations of the framework. It is 
hoped that future improvements to the framework 
noted earlier in this report will also improve the 
perceptions of staff and therefore increase survey 
scores. Surveying staff about performance (or 
indeed any sort of governance or management 
framework) is valuable, as the findings of such 
surveys are an excellent way to drive further 
improvements. If those developing performance 
frameworks do not discuss the framework with 
those being measured, they will likely end up 
developing a framework divorced from reality  
(and thus likely sub-optimal) and are almost 
certain to encounter staff opposition (and perhaps 
many of the perverse behaviours noted earlier).
•	 On a related point, at times, senior management 
may not be entirely sure what should be measured. 
Many managers have been brought up on a diet 
of crime rate data and may not have a clear idea 
what the objectives of specialist units truly are. 
This point reinforces the need for consultation  
at the grassroots, as frontline staff will be able  
to provide the necessary information for the 
development of meaningful measures.
•	 Proportional use of specialist resources. This point 
may be specific only to AMCOS, but is assumed 
by the authors to be universal. It relates to the 
share of specialist policing services provided  
to other policing groups. As police forces are 
heterogeneous, and traditional performance 
management schemes often stimulate 
competitiveness, there will often be keen interest 
as to the proportion of a particular service 
(fingerprints, dog deployments) provided to 
particular groups. Any framework must include 
some mechanism to identify these proportional 
shares and indeed, the authors would recommend 
that the more nuanced the data, the better. This 
allows for additional ad-hoc reports to be quickly 
developed in response to concerns or complaints. 
It also allows for the production of interesting 
analyses correlating crime rates in particular areas 
with the usage of particular specialist policing 
services.
•	 Theoretical issues of niche unit performance.  
The measurement of performance by niche 
units—proactive specialist investigation units in 
particular—is a problem that, to use the same 
analogy as this report’s title is a ‘nut that nobody 
has yet cracked’. It is the view of the authors that 
the only way to validly evaluate the effect of major 
investigative operations is to conduct operation-
specific post-operational evaluations. These are 
incredibly resource intensive. The authors also 
believe that there is a need for substantial public 
surveying about the prevalence of organised 
crime. Also, understanding that the public may be 
reticent about commenting on such a topic, there 
should also be regular surveying of Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources as well. A combination of 
post-operational evaluations, public surveying  
and Covert Human Intelligence Sources surveying 
will enable us to begin developing real outcome 
measures for proactive specialist investigation 
units, in the organised crime field at least.
Those of an outcome-oriented personality who have 
read this report probably have a simple question—
has the framework improved AMCOS performance? 
It is a difficult question to answer. Without going  
into sensitive detail, there have been substantial 
improvements in terms of the quantity and quality of 
outputs delivered by some units, although whether 
the visibility granted by the framework was the 
reason is unknown. There has been anecdotal 
evidence that increased reporting of operational 
workloads has stimulated enhanced esprit de corps. 
There is also evidence that some components of  
the framework, notably CALL, have had a directly 
beneficial effect on some tactics and procedures. 
The most telling piece of information comes from 
overall AMCOS Satisfaction Survey results in 2010 
and 2011 (both carried out well after the Framework 
was first implemented). The AMCOS Satisfaction 
Survey asked recipients of specialist policing services 
how they perceived the delivery of those services. In 
2010, the average score for satisfaction was 3.38 out 
of five; in 2011 it had improved to 3.82 out of five. It 
should also be remembered that any performance 
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framework, no matter how well-designed, is only  
as good as the use made of it.
Conclusion
In this paper, the development of the AMCOS 
Performance Framework has been described. 
AMCOS is a specialist policing body and specialist 
policing—whether forensics, specialist operations, 
specialist investigations, or intelligence analysis—is 
an area that traditional police performance 
measurement schemes do not deal well with. 
Indeed, some feel that traditional police performance 
measurement schemes do not deal well with any 
police work and instead, lead to perverse behaviours 
that have little or nothing to do with the true value of 
policing.
The AMCOS model was developed as a response to 
criticism of the visibility of AMCOS activities. It was 
derived from analysis of both strategic goals and 
tactical workstreams, and to date has been largely 
focused on outputs and activities, due to the  
fact that AMCOS contributes to but is seldom 
responsible for policing outcomes. Where AMCOS  
is responsible for such outcomes, however, some 
outcome measures have been developed. 
Performance indicators within the framework cover 
all aspects of AMCOS business and in the 36 or so 
months since it was first developed, the framework 
has been subjected to several major revisions.
The value of locally developed frameworks seems 
obvious—they are more easily accepted by staff, 
more difficult to manipulate and more accurate in 
terms of the measures they focus on. In the future, 
the goal is to increase the focus on outcomes within 
the AMCOS Performance Framework and combine 
it further with planning, project and risk management 
activities to provide AMCOS with the basis for true 
policing professionalism into the 21st century.
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AMCOS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
• The AMCOS Performance Management Framework is a 
means by which staff can be made aware of the activities 
undertaken by AMCOS units. 
• As it currently stands, it is not an evaluation tool; there are 
no targets or quotas. 
• Also, as it currently stands, it does not measure outcomes. 
For example, it might measure the number of 
methamphetamine seizures, but it doesn't measure the effect 
of those seizures on the street price of the drug, the number 
of users, or the average purity of the drug.  
• Much of what AMCOS does is not easily quantified. As such, 
the Performance Management Framework uses a lot of 
qualitative data. 
• The AMCOS Performance Management Framework has 
recently been reviewed to better align with Police Output 
Classes. 
HOW WE MEASURE PERFORMANCE 
• The performance of AMCOS is measured against AMCOS 
Performance Outputs (APOs). These APOs are output-type 
measures derived from strategic guidance on outcomes 
and impacts. APOs exist at three levels: operational 
measures, tactical measures, and sub-tactical measures, 
depending on the complexity of the activity they describe The 
strategic guidance utilised to develop the APMOs included, 
but was not restricted to, the New Zealand Police Strategic 
Plan, New Zealand Police Annual Report, New Zealand 
Police Statement of Intent, and the Service Level Agreement 
with the Auckland Board of Management (BoM). 
• We then visited units with initial drafts and consulted with 
those units to ensure that the outputs covered the range of 
activities that those units undertook. So far, there have been 
three major revisions of the output list, as we work towards 
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reducing the number of outputs, as well as ensuring 
accuracy. 
HOW THE REPORTING CYCLE WORKS 
• Currently, every six and twelve months, Policing 
Development produces a unit-specific information request 
covering activities undertaken during the reporting period. 
Some units report on more APOs than others, depending on 
the complexity of their work. 
• Policing Development then collates the information returns 
and produces a performance report covering the reporting 
period. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH BUSINESS PLAN AND UNIT PLANS 
• Currently, we are working towards aligning the activities 
(outputs) described in the Business Plan with the 
Performance Management Framework. We are also working 
towards aligning the activities described in Unit Plans with 
the Framework. Eventually, it is hoped that all documentation 
will "sing from the same song book" and there will be a 
single, easily understood set of output classes that can be 
used for all major planning and reporting activities within 
AMCOS. 
THE FUTURE 
• AMCOS Policing Development has a five-year plan to 
enhance the Performance Management Framework. From 
mid-2011, we hope to include some outcome
measurements, such as the price and purity of drugs. From 
mid-2012, we hope to know enough to include evaluation: 
that is, setting targets for each year and then seeing how 
well AMCOS does against those targets. 
THE APOS 
• The following pages show the APOs in detail.
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